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The purpose of the study was to examine the influence that 
prejudicial attitude formation had on the subsequent 
reduction of that prejudice. The experiment tested the 
hypothesis that in order for an intervention to change 
prejudicial attitudes effectively, that intervention must 
engage the same processes that led their initial 
development. Subjects were randomly assigned to receive 
either an information-based or interaction-based attitude 
formation procedure. The subjects received one of two 
prejudice-reduction interventions. They were either 
information-based or interaction-based in nature. The 
greatest decrease in prejudicial attitudes was hypothesized 
to occur when: (a) subjects received an information-based
induction along with and information-based intervention, and 
(b) subject received an interaction-based induction along 
with an information-based intervention. Results were mixed. 
No support was found for the primary hypothesis. However, 
the results revealed several other interesting phenomena 
relevant to prejudice-reduction processes in general. The 
implications of this study in relation to prejudice 
formation and change are discussed.
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Introduction
The world situation is a testament to the power of 
prejudice. Throughout the former eastern block countries, 
ethnic conflicts litter the fields with the causalities of 
intolerance. In the country that was once Yugoslavia - 
hundreds have lost their lives to further a war fueled by 
this "disease." What could perpetuate the ethnic hatreds 
between these people? Surely in this enlightened age, an 
age characterized by outstanding accomplishments, the people 
of the world could remove the barriers of intolerance, 
fostering a society immune to this hatred. But, this is not 
the case-. Today social psychologists study the factors 
involved in prejudice, investigating how erroneous attitudes 
are formed, preserved, and - possibly - changed. Past 
research has shown that prejudice can be decreased and 
attitudes can change, but only under certain circumstances. 
The present research was designed to explore this topic 
further. Specifically, I proposed that, in order for an 
intervention to change prejudicial attitudes most 
effectively, that intervention must engage the same 
processes that led to the development of those attitudes in 
the first place.
Processes Through Which Prejudice Develops
Previous research has shown that intergroup prejudices 
and perceptions may result from either information-based 
processes or interaction-based processes. Although these
1
distinctions have not been formally presented in any 
article, each appears to tap into a conceptually different 
body of research.
Information-Based Processes
A large body of research has shown that group 
stereotypes may develop purely as a result of information 
that individuals encounter, perceive, encode and integrate 
into cognitive structures (Crocker, Hannah & Weber, 1983; 
Hamilton, Driscoll, & Worth, 1989; Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; 
Hastie, 1980; Hastie & Kumar, 1979; Schaller, 1992; Srull, 
1981; Wyer & Gordon, 1982; Wyer & Mairtin, 1986). These 
information-based processes do not depend upon any actual 
intergroup interaction. In fact, any stereotype that 
emerges as a result of a purely information-based process 
can emerge in the absence of any direct association with the 
target group. It is this consideration that sets the 
information-based "system" apart from other processes 
through which stereotypes develop.
An example of research on purely information-based 
stereotype development processes is a study by Hamilton and 
Gifford (1976). Subjects received information about members 
of two different groups. This information consisted of 
behavior-descriptive sentences about the members of the two 
groups. Although the ratio of desirable behaviors to 
undesirable behaviors was the same for both groups, the 
experimenters varied the number of total behaviors for each
3
group. Thus, subjects received more statements about Group 
A than Group B and the statements described more desirable 
than undesirable behaviors (but the ratio of desirable to 
undesirable behaviors was the same). The results showed 
that subjects formed a negative stereotype about Group B -- 
apparently as a result of over-attending to the infrequent 
(and therefore salient) undesirable behaviors describing 
Group B, the minority group. This research suggests that 
stereotypes can be formed through the encoding and 
processing of group-relevant information.
Interaction-Based Processes
Other research has shown that prejudice may emerge from 
very different processes resulting from actual interactions 
between competing groups. Perhaps the classic example of 
interaction-based prejudice formation is the famous 
"Robber's Cave" study of Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and 
Sherif (1954). Subjects were boys participating in a boy 
scout camp outside Oklahoma City. As part of their camp 
activities, the boys were randomly assigned to be in groups 
called the "Rattlers" or the "Eagles." Initially, the boys 
engaged in activities within their own group, without ever 
contacting the other group. Then, the groups discovered 
each other. Open competition was encouraged, and the groups 
entered a phase of extremely combative activities. During 
this time, the boys showed favoritism and solidarity within 
their own group. At the same time, both groups exhibited
4
prejudice toward members of the outgroup. This prejudice 
developed not merely as a result of information processing, 
but from motives emerging from their group classification 
and competitive intergroup interaction.
By interacting, the group identity is made salient.
This implies that an individual's classification in a 
certain group will be more noticeable. In fact, additional 
research and theory suggests that mere classification into 
one group facilitates prejudice against members of other 
groups (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1978,1982). Social Identity 
Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) suggests that when personal 
identity is threatened, people will seek to enhance their 
well-being by accentuating the differences between their own 
group and relevant outgroups. This process may play a major 
role in the development of group prejudice (Gaertner, 
Dovidio, Mann, Murrell, & Pomare, 1990; Gaertner, Mann, 
Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989). Thus, this theory presents a 
rational behind why an individual would form prejudice from 
basic interaction coupled with group classification.
Prejudice-Reduction Processes
Just as prejudice may develop as a result of 
information-based or interaction-based processes, 
interventions aimed at prejudice reduction also draw on 
either information-based or interaction-based processes. 
Information-based interventions assume that attitude change 
begins when people attend to and comprehend relevant
information concerning a subject (McGuire, 1969). For 
instance, if an individual receives information designed to 
change his/her attitudes, this would only succeed if the 
person understood and encoded the presented arguments. In 
contrast, interaction-based interventions assume that 
prejudice can be reduced through cooperative encounters 
between different groups. By cooperating, the group 
boundaries become blurred, reducing identification with a 
particular group, and therefore, reducing prejudicial 
attitudes (Allport, 1954; Gaertner, Dovidio, Mann, Murrell,
& Pomare, 1990; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif,
1954). For example, the members of two fraternities, 
traditionally enemies, may become friends if both groups get 
involved in a community project wherein each group must rely 
on the other to succeed.
Information-Based Processes
The roots of the information-based process of 
stereotype reduction can be traced to the work of Fritz 
Heider (1944,1958). Heider described humans as "intuitive 
scientists" or "naive epistemologists," constantly striving 
to maintain control over their environment through a 
perceived understanding of that environment. This 
perspective suggests that stereotypes and prejudice result 
from an individual's attempts to simplify his or her 
environment. This simplification allows the individual to 
understand their environment using less cognitive effort to
6
do so. Then this knowledge and understanding can be used to 
form predictions about the environment. Thus, stereotypes 
allow people to predict their environment better.
For example, a Korean shopowner may harbor the belief 
that black people do not pay their bills; consequently, the 
shopowner may refuse to sell to them. However, if this 
shopowner uncovers new information suggesting that black 
customers can be trusted, it would be beneficial to begin 
selling to members of this group. Thus, a change in the 
shopowner's beliefs would allow a more accurate prediction 
of the environment -- in this case, resulting in increased 
profits.
Essentially, this perspective implies that prejudice is 
the result of cognitive structures -- stereotypic beliefs -- 
that may change when one encounters information inconsistent 
with those existing structures. There are currently three 
models of stereotype change that draw upon this general 
theoretical perspective.
The "bookkeeping" model (Rothbart,1981) suggests that 
stereotypes change as a result of a gradual accumulation of 
disconfirming information, suggesting that this model is 
dependent upon the individual encoding and remembering the 
information encountered. Also, the tenets of the model are 
that people keep a mental record of all information about a 
particular group. When a person makes decisions about a 
particular group, they check their mental "scorecard" --
7
drawing on all relevant information concerning the 
performance of group members in a certain situation. In the 
current example, the storeowner may remember 15 occasions on 
which black customers failed to pay their bills, and only 5 
occasions on which they paid. Thus, the stereotype might be 
that black customers do not pay. If over the course of time 
this ratio changed, then the "scorecard" would also change.
Over time the original belief would change gradually with 
each bill paid. Eventually, the storeowner might no longer 
believe that black customers were financial risks.
In contrast to the gradual change hypothesized by the 
"bookkeeping" model, the "conversion" model (Rothbart, 1981) 
suggests that stereotypes change only when powerful and 
disconfirmatory information is encountered suddenly.
According to this perspective, individuals are unlikely to 
change their beliefs unless overwhelmed with information 
that powerfully discredits stereotypic attitudes. For 
example, the storeowner may "convert" his/her belief about 
black customers if 10 black men enter the store, choose 
items for purchase, and each one diligently pays for each
item. The "conversion" model differs from the "bookkeeping"
»
model in that there is no implication that disconfirming
need exceed the confirming instances. Insteadformation 
a radical shift of belief occurs from condensed exposure to 
disconfirming information. An additional difference between 
the "conversion" model and the "bookkeeping" model concerns
8
the encoding of small amounts of disconfirming information. 
The "bookkeeping" model suggests that all disconfirming 
information is encoded and integrated into the evolving 
cognitive "scorecard." In contrast, the "conversion" model 
suggests that small instances of disconfirming information 
will not influence the individual's stereotypes; only 
salient condensed disconfirmatory information can cause the 
belief to change.
A third model, the "subtyping" model (Taylor,1981) is 
altogether different from the other two. According to the 
subtyping model, original stereotypes do not change in any 
global, evaluative way. Instead, the presence of 
disconfirming information leads to the formation of 
subtypes or subcategories of the original stereotype. These 
exceptions are then cognitively stored separately from the 
original stereotype. For example, our storeowner may 
analyze all the black customers that successfully paid for 
their merchandise. The owner may determine that only black 
men in suits paid for the goods. Thus, the shopowner may 
tell a new clerk, "Most blacks can't be trusted and don't 
pay their bills, except the men in suits. They're 
different. You can sell to them."
Which of these three models best accounts for the 
existing data? Several recent studies have addressed this 
question (Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Rothbart & Lewis, 1988; 
Weber & Crocker, 1983; see Hewstone, in press, for a
9
review). The results of this research provide evidence 
primarily for the subtyping model.
These results suggest that stereotypes are quite 
resistant to change, indicating that 
stereotype-disconfirming information often leads to 
subtyping rather than to changes in the overall stereotype. 
This does not suggest that information-based procedures are 
entirely ineffective in changing stereotypic beliefs. If 
the boundaries set for the subtype could be extended to 
include the majority of a particular group, then a reduction 
in the amount of prejudice exhibited by an individual may 
occur.
Although the research in this area supports the 
contention that stereotypes and prejudice may be influenced 
by information-based interventions, another body of research 
focuses on a substantially different way in which to change 
stereotypes and prejudice.
Interaction-Based Processes
This perspective on intergroup perception focuses on 
social rather than cognitive bases of prejudice. The 
implicit hypothesis is that cognitive processes are 
subsidiary to the emotional/motivational processes that 
occur when groups interact. A large body of research 
suggests that group prejudice can be reduced by intergroup 
interaction in which members of two distinct groups 
cooperate to attain an overall goal. An example of this
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effect is the Sherif et al. (1954) study. As described 
above, Sherif et al. first developed group prejudice using 
interaction processes. Then they attempted to reduce the 
intergroup animosity by asking the boys to engage in 
activities designed to bring the two groups into contact. 
Even though the members of the "Eagles" and the "Rattlers" 
were in the same place at the same time, the original group 
boundaries remained, along with the animosity and prejudice. 
Sherif et al. finally turned to activities that required the 
two groups to cooperate. The experimenters presented the 
boys with superordinate goals that could only be attained 
when all the boys cooperated collectively. This 
intervention succeeded in reducing prejudice. The 
researchers reported that many boys from both the "Eagles" 
and the "Rattlers" became friends, even to the extent that 
they requested to be sent home on the same bus.
The theory behind the interactive-based intervention 
involves group classification and group boundaries. 
Specifically, it has been argued that classification in a 
group produces bias toward individuals outside the group 
(Brewer, 1979; Stephan, 1985; Tajfel, 1978,1982). Just as 
the "Rattlers" developed strong prejudice against the 
"Eagles," so may individuals in general develop prejudice 
against groups to which they don't belong. The effectiveness 
of interactive-based interventions depends upon the 
reduction of the salience of intergroup boundaries. This,
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in turn, should reduce the prejudice between the two groups.
Past research in this area has supported the hypothesis 
that interdependent interaction reduces prejudice. Beyond 
the work of Sherif et al. (1954), support was found in a 
series of studies done by Aronson, Blaney, Stephan, Sikes, 
and Snapp (1978). Deploying what they called the "jigsaw 
classroom," researchers placed school children into racially 
diverse groups. These children were then asked to learn 
about a particular topic. However, unlike normal 
instruction in which the teacher tells every student about 
the topic, each student was taught part of the topic 
independently. Thus, each student knew certain facts about 
the topic and was required to share this information with 
the other students. Using this system, each student relied 
on the others to gain full knowledge of the topic. The 
results suggested that racial relations improved when the 
students became dependent upon one another to succeed in 
learning the topic. Apparently, the cooperative interaction 
reduced perceptual boundaries between the races, reducing 
prejudice.
A more controlled study by Gaertner, Mann, Murrell and 
Dovidio (1989) examined the effects of two different 
intergroup interaction procedures. The researchers first 
divided subjects into two arbitrary groups of three people 
per group. Then, the members of each group cooperated on a 
task designed to foster group identity, doing so without
12
knowing that the other three-person group existed. Then the 
two groups were brought together in a room and placed in one 
of three conditions. In one condition, each group was 
seated at separate tables, making intergroup interaction 
impossible, and asked to perform a task while cooperating 
only with their own group members. In another condition, 
subjects were intermixed around the same table and asked to 
perform an interaction task in which members from both 
groups needed to cooperate. And, in the third condition, 
each subject was seated in a separate cubicle and asked to 
work on the task individually. The researchers found that 
intergroup bias was reduced when subjects cooperated in the 
larger group and when subjects performed the task 
individually. No reduction in intergroup bias was found 
when subjects interacted only with members of their initial 
group. The authors suggested that two different processes 
of prejudice reduction were occurring. In the cooperation 
condition, the initial group boundaries were changed, such 
that the salience of the larger group outweighed that of the 
smaller group. In the individualized condition, because 
subjects focused more on themselves than on the initial 
group classification, the group boundaries were less 
salient, and this too reduced intergroup bias.
In another study, Desforges, Lord, Ramsey, Mason, Van 
Leeuwen, West, & Lepper (1991) told subjects they would be 
interacting with a former schizophrenic patient. Actually
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the person with whom they interacted was an experimental 
confederate. Subjects initially rated the favorability of 
both the individual, former, mental patient and mental 
patients, in general. In this task, subjects' outcomes were 
interdependent upon those of the perceived mental patient. 
Not only did their opinions of the individual mental patient 
become more favorable, but their opinions about formal 
mental patients as a group also improved.
An important factor in the effectiveness of 
interaction-based procedures is that both groups must be 
able to benefit from the interaction. Work by Thompson 
(1993) suggested that group interaction will not reduce 
group bias if ingroup and outgroup members cannot achieve 
their goals. In one study, subjects interacted with members 
of their outgroup. However, this interaction was designed 
such that neither group achieved successful outcomes. In 
this condition, prejudice against the outgroup did not 
decrease.
Summary: Information-Based vs. Interaction-Based 
Interventions
The preceding evidence suggests that both 
information-based processes and interaction-based processes 
can reduce group prejudice. However, in none of these 
studies did the investigators explicitly compare the 
effectiveness of the two prejudice reduction approaches, nor 
did they attempt to consider the processes through which
14
prejudice originally developed. For example, if the Korean 
storeowner developed a negative attitude about black 
customers by assessing the relevant information and arriving 
at a conclusion, will an interaction-based intervention be 
as effective as an information-based intervention at 
changing his prejudicial belief? Perhaps the process that 
the storeowner used to develop an impression about black 
people resulted in the formation of a unique process-related 
cognitive structure. If so, any intervention designed to 
influence this structure may need to engage the same 
information-based process if it is to be successful. Note 
that this example dealt with information-based prejudice 
formation. In fact, the same question would hold true for 
interaction created prejudice. Perhaps the only 
intervention that would work would be one that was 
interaction-based.
Past research and theory (Schaller & Maass, 1989) 
suggested that information-based and interaction-based 
processes may differentially influence group impressions. 
Initial presentation of information-based material may lead 
first to the formation of a cognitive structure about a 
group (stereotype), whereas with an interaction-based 
process, the result of an initial affective or behavioral 
bias against a group would foster the development of the 
negative impressions (prejudice). For example, a person may 
form a negative image (stereotype) about Hispanics through
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reading newspapers and watching TV. Then when he/she 
encounters the group this person may exhibit discrimination 
against its members, forming a negative impressions 
(prejudice). On the other hand, a person working with 
Hispanics on a job may find that he/she is discriminating 
against them, creating prejudice, and therefore form a 
negative image (stereotype) to justify that prejudice.
Thus, both processes will produce the same outcomes 
(stereotypes and prejudice), but the order in which they are 
formed (stereotype first, prejudice second or vice versa) 
may be different. This suggests that the way group 
impressions form may be an important factor influencing 
access to and change of these impressions.
The Process-Soecificity Hypothesis
Similar ideas have been expressed in other domains of 
study. For instance, several different theories suggest 
that encoding of information can influence later retrieval 
of that information. Research on state dependent learning 
(Overton,1972) and context dependent learning (Light & 
Carter-Sobell, 1970) suggest that the processes used to 
learn information can greatly influence the ability to 
recall that information. Although these phenomena deal with 
somewhat different processes, they are all based on the 
conceptual idea that the encoding context influences 
retrieval.
Research by Barden, Garber, Leiman, Ford, and Masters
(1985) suggests that changes in affective states conform to 
the tenets of a "process specificity hypothesis" (Barden, 
Garber, Duncan, & Masters, 1981). According to this 
hypothesis, affective states are most easily remediated by 
later experiences that are similar to those that led to the 
affective experience in the first place. In their study, a 
particular mood was induced in children. Then the 
experimenters attempted to change the children's mood using 
procedures that were either similar or dissimilar to those 
used in the induction. The results showed the greatest mood 
change in the condition where the persuasion procedures were 
similar to the induction procedures. Thus, this implies 
that the remediation of a particular mood occurred when the 
intervention procedure engaged the same processes used to 
induce the affective state.
The malleability of attitudes may also depend upon the 
way in which those attitudes were initially formed. Recent 
research by Edwards (1990) demonstrated that the processes 
involved in forming attitudes greatly affect the ways that 
these attitudes might be changed.
Edwards (1990) hypothesized that attitudes formed 
through one of two distinct processes (affective or 
cognitive) change only when the persuasion attempts engage 
the same process that was engaged during attitude formation. 
To test this hypothesis, subjects were presented with 
Chinese ideographs. Each ideograph was preceded by either
17
an affect-producing slide or a written statement about the 
ideograph. Subjects in the affective-induced condition were 
presented with a slide of a happy face for 10 milliseconds 
(faster than can be consciously perceived). The ideograph 
was then presented for 2 sec. Then positive information 
about the ideograph was presented for 30 sec., followed by 
another presentation of the ideograph for 2 sec. It was 
expected that through this procedure impressions about the 
ideographs would primarily be caused by affect because the 
affective slide preceded the written information. Thus, 
each slide was affectively tainted before the written 
information occurred. For these reasons, the resultant 
impressions were expected to be mainly affectively-based.
Subjects in the cognitively-induced procedure first 
received the ideograph for 2 sec, followed by a 30 sec 
information presentation, then the 10 millisecond happy face 
slide and another 2 sec presentation of the ideograph. It 
was expected that subjects would form a positive impression 
that would be caused primarily by cognitive information 
processing mechanisms.
In an attempt to change subjects' attitudes, Edwards 
(1990) repeated the above techniques in a second phase of 
the experimental session, changing both the presented 
information and the presented slide to be negative rather 
than positive. The results showed that the largest amount 
of attitude change occurred when subjects first received an
18
affective induction followed by the affective persuasion. 
This magnitude of change was greater than when these 
subjects received a cognitive persuasion. It was expected 
that the subjects who received a cognitive induction would 
experience'a greater change in impressions when presented 
with a cognitive persuasion. However, this proved to be 
non-significant. Although, as Edwards (1990) suggested, 
these cognitively-formed impressions had a large affective 
component associated with them.
Edwards (1990) interpreted the results to suggest that 
initial contact with an object is subject to affective or 
cognitive development, such that this encounter forms a 
distinct mental pattern. Edwards (1990) experiment 
suggested that an affectively-created mental pattern is most 
easily accessed and changed when later experiences engage 
the affective processes that led to the development of that 
specific structure. Edwards (1990) suggested that this 
process-specificity also would apply to purely, cognitively- 
formed impressions.
The preceding research suggests that something is going 
on within the psychological structures of the individual. 
Apparently, initial contact with a stimulus creates a mental 
pattern the person then uses to access that stimulus. In 
cases of impression formation, persuasive procedures that 
engage and access the initial cognitive structures should be 
more likely to change the person's attitudes. In contrast,
19
persuasion procedures that fail to engage these structures 
will also fail to change the individual's attitudes.
An examination of previous research suggests that 
process specificity may be a factor in the formation and 
change of group prejudice. For example, many studies fall 
under the category of those that formed prejudice using 
interaction-based processes and then changed them using 
similar interaction-based processes (Sherif et al., 1954; 
Gaertner et al. 1989; Thompson, 1993). Other studies that 
looked at prejudice reduction used groups about which the 
subjects had previously formed opinions, such as librarians 
or fraternity members (Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; Weber & 
Crocker, 1983; Rothbart & Lewis, 1988; Desforges et al., 
1991). It is impossible to know to what extent these 
pre-existing stereotypes resulted from information-based 
versus interaction-based processes. No research exists in 
which group impressions clearly were formed through one type 
of process and then changed through a different process. 
According to the proposed Process Specificity Hypothesis, 
there would be little impression change expected under these 
conditions.
The purpose of this experiment was to test the 
underlying hypothesis that in order to reduce prejudice 
successfully, interventions designed to change prejudice 
must engage the same processes used in the formation of that 
prejudice. For the purposes of this experiment, prejudice
20
was defined as the difference between the favorability 
ratings of each target group.
Methods
Overview
The following procedures were designed to induce a 
group attitude using one of two different methods. Then, a 
second procedure was implemented to change the attitude 
using one of two different persuasion methods.
During the induction phase, attitudes were formed in 
subjects by one of the following two procedures:
1. Information procedure. Subjects were presented 
with information about the abilities and behaviors of two 
different groups (group X and group Y). The information 
presented one group more favorably than the other.
2. Interactive procedure. Subjects learned that they
were members of one of the two groups (group X or group Y) 
and engaged in a cooperation task with other members of 
their group. Also, during this cooperation period, they 
competed against members of the other group.
During the persuasion phase, subjects were presented 
with one of the following two procedures:
1. Information procedure. Subjects received
information about the abilities and behaviors of both groups 
X and Y. This information was designed such that it 
appeared both groups were equally favorable.
2. Interactive procedure. Subjects engaged in a
cooperative task with members of the group against which
they were competing during the induction phase and about
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which they were expected to have formed a negative 
impression.
Subjects participated in groups of 8. Of these 8, four 
subjects during the induction phase were assigned to receive 
the information procedure (receiving favorable and 
unfavorable information about groups X and Y ) . The 
remaining four subjects were assigned during the induction 
phase to receive the interactive procedure (cooperating with 
members of their own group, and competing against members of 
the outgroup).
The primary dependent variable was the favorability 
ratings for both Group X and Group Y. These were assessed 
using a Likert-type rating scale (see description below)
These ratings were assessed twice: (a) immediately 
following the induction phase, but before the persuasion 
phase; and (b) immediately following the persuasion phase.
Subjects
Subjects were 180 undergraduates (96 males, 84 females) 
at the University of Montana who participated for partial 
fulfillment of a course requirement. Since no effect of 
gender was found, it will not be discussed further. All 
subjects participated in the Psychology 100 screening prior 
to the experiment. In this screening, their demographic 
information was collected. Then, the experimenters called
t
each subject to schedule a time for their participation. 
Subjects participated in single-gender groups of eight
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subjects per session. (Subjects were run in single gender 
groups to minimize error variance in the dependent measure 
that may have resulted from the unique impact of male-female 
interaction).
Procedure
When subjects arrived, they were met by two 
experimenters and asked to sit in specific areas of a large 
classroom (see experimenter's script, Appendix A). They 
were told the study was designed to examine people's 
attitudes toward individuals who possess a distinct 
personality trait. Also, they were told that to remove any 
bias, they would neither be told what the personality trait 
was nor would they be informed of which group possessed the 
trait. For these reasons, the groups were referred to as 
Group X and Group Y. Subjects were not given any additional 
information concerning the personality types that comprised 
Groups X and Y. Additionally, subjects were told that, 
during the experiment, specific attitude assessment 
questionnaires would be given more than once. The reason, 
they were told, was because peoples' attitudes tend to 
change in short periods of time and these changes, if any, 
would be of interest to the experimenter.
Group Categorization:
Subjects were told that they were asked to participate 
because of their unique personality Characteristics, 
assessed prior to the experiment in a separate screening.
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In fact, all subjects had to participate in this screening 
to be eligible for the experiment. However, subjects 
weren't screened for any personality-relevant information; 
their participation in the screening was only done to be 
consistent with the cover story. The experimenter continued 
by telling subjects that the experiment focused on one 
particular personality trait, a trait that previous research 
had shown to be prevalent across cultures. However, the 
experimenter pointed out, not all people possess this 
personality characteristic. In fact, people were commonly 
classified as: (a) definitely possessing the trait, (b) 
definitely not possessing the trait, or (c) unable to be 
classified as possessing or not possessing the trait. The 
experimenter continued by telling subjects that they were 
called specifically because they fell into one of these 
three categories. The experimenter explained that the 
distribution of subjects was predetermined from the 
screening such that in the current group of eight, two
people were members of group X, two people were members of
group Y, and four people were unclassifiable.
At this point, the experimenter went to the front of 
the room and checked a large computer printout. Then, 
he/she returned to the subjects with colored badges and made 
the group assignments (in fact, all subjects were randomly 
assigned to one of the three possible classifications).
Subjects were asked to affix the badges to their clothes for
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easy group identification. The colors of the badges were: 
Blue badges for members of group X, Green badges for members 
of group Y, and White badges for those individuals who could 
not be classified at the current time. The experimenter 
explained that, although the questionnaire given during the 
screening was a fairly good instrument for detecting the 
existence of the personality trait, it was somewhat 
insensitive to finer distinctions. Therefore, those 
subjects who were unable to be classified required further 
evaluation to determine their group membership. Thus, 
another test, more precise than the first, would be 
administered later in the experiment.
To set their minds at ease the experimenter explained 
that inclusion in a certain group did not represent some 
kind of mental disorder, but that these groups merely 
represented two different, but common, personality types, 
neither of which was objectively better than the other. At 
this point, the subjects who were classified as either Group 
X or Group Y were asked to follow one of the experimenters 
to a different room. Subjects were told that this division 
was necessary to conduct 'the required tests. This other 
room was divided into two small 6' X 9' compartments with a 
door between. The experimenter asked the two members of 
Group X to go into one compartment, and the two members of 
Groups Y to go into the other. For the unclassified 
subjects (the people still sitting in the first room with
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the other experimenter), each of them were asked to move 
into one of the individual cubicles lining the outside wall. 
At this point, all subjects were in position to receive the 
attitude induction procedures.
Induction Procedure-.
Information condition (unclassified subjects). The 
experimenter informed the unclassified subjects that they 
would receive a "slide show" via computer. They were told 
that each slide contained information about members of group 
X and group Y and that they should read silently each slide 
as it was presented. Also, the experimenter told them that 
the slide show consisted of 40 slides and that the 
presentation would take approximately six minutes. Each 
slide contained: an individual's first name, that 
individual's group classification (Group X or Group Y), and 
a behavior that individual performed. Some of these 
behaviors were positive and some negative. Two of the four 
unclassified subjects received information designed to 
create a favorable impression of Group X and a neutral 
impression of Group Y. For these subjects, the slide show 
presented 15 positive and 5 negative statements about 
members of Group X and 10 positive/10 negative statements 
about members of Group Y. The other two subjects received 
information designed to create a favorable impression of 
Group Y and a neutral impression of Group X. For these 
subjects, they were presented with 15 positive/ 5 negative
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statements about members of Group Y and 10 positive/ 10
negative statements about members of Group X. (see Table 1).
After the presentation, subjects were asked to come out of 
the cubicles and wait for the second group to return to the 
room.
Cooperation/competition condition. The experimenter 
told the subjects classified as Group X or Y that a 
competition existed between these two groups. Thus,
subjects were asked to compete on a task to achieve the best
possible score. Subjects were informed that the score they 
achieved with the other member of their group would be added 
to an overall composite score for their particular group. 
Then they were told that all members of the group with the 
highest overall score would receive recognition at the end 
of the semester. The purpose of this procedure was to 
present an ostensible competition, not only at the small, 
two-person group level,but also at a larger, more 
encompassing level.
The experimenter then handed out the instruction and 
scoring sheet for the task and answered any questions 
concerning the task. Time was kept while the subjects 
completed a task known as the "NASA team exercise" (Aronson 
et al., 1978; see Appendix B). Specifically, they were told 
that they had crash landed on the moon and must travel 200 
miles to their mother ship. Spread out before them were the 
remnants of their ship, consisting of 15 items. They must
Table 1




Statements (X pos; Y neut) (X neut;Y pos )
Positive X 15 10
Positive Y 10 15
Negative X 5 10
Negative Y 10 5
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rank order the importance of each item and give a rational 
for the item's use. Subjects were told that a correct answer 
did exist for this task, and that these answers were 
developed by experts who studied the lunar environment. 
Subjects were told that their responses would be compared 
against the correct answers to determine a score. First 
they would have three minutes to complete the ranking of the 
items, upon which time the experimenter would collect the 
scoring sheets and correct them. They would then have 2 
minutes to complete another ranking that would also be 
scored and returned. Following this, they would have an 
additional minute to complete the final ranking of the 
items. The experimenter gave feedback after the first two 
rankings. However, subjects were told that their final 
score was a composite of all of their previous rankings, and 
that it would take a few minutes to correct them. At this 
point the experimenters led the subjects back to the large 
experimental room.
Attitude assessment. At this point, all subjects 
returned to the large main room. The experimenters asked 
all subjects to return to their initial seats. Then, they 
administered the attitude assessment questionnaire along 
with the 12-item Personal Need for Structure (PNS) 
questionnaire (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993; see Appendix C). The 
results of the PNS were analyzed as a secondary factor in 
the overall analysis. The subjects were told that the PNS
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scale was a questionnaire that would help the experimenter 
understand the subjects better. Also, they were told that 
the PNS scale did not measure the main personality 
characteristic that was used to categorize the subjects into 
different groups.
Dependent measures. The primary dependent measure was 
the average favorability score for members of Group X and 
Group Y made on a Likert-type scale. This scale was 
composed of various measures, each designed to tap into the 
favorability toward members of Groups X and Y (see Appendix 
D ) . The first set of questions asked subjects to rate how 
certain attributes described members of each group. The 
attributes were: popular, unsociable, irresponsible, loyal, 
trustworthy, honest, and happy. These items were taken from 
a scale originally used by Hamilton and Gifford (1976).
Then subjects rated each group on a variety of questions 
designed to assess their opinions of Group X and Group Y 
unobtrusively. An example of these questions was: "A 
college freshman takes calculus and receives a D for a 
course grade. What could the student's membership be?" 
Finally, subjects answered questions derived from the 
Interpersonal Judgment Scale (Byrne & Wong, 1962) that had 
been revised for the purposes of this experiment. An example 
of these questions was: "I believe that I would very much 
dislike working with members of group X in an experiment" -- 
rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale. Averaging across
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these various items, two favorability scores were developed 
-- one for Group X and one for Group Y. Results from pilot 
data suggested that the internal consistency of all the 
questions assessing each score was high: For the Group X 
score, Cronbach's alpha = .89; for the Group Y score, 
Cronbach's alpha =.90. When the questionnaires were 
completed and collected, the persuasion phase began. 
Persuasion Procedure:
At this point, there were four subjects who formed 
attitudes through the information procedure and four 
subjects who formed attitude through the
cooperation/competition procedure. For the persuasion phase 
of the experiment, all eight subjects were assigned either 
to the information-persuasion condition or the 
cooperation/competition persuasion condition.
Information-persuasion condition. For the sessions 
devoted to this condition, each of the eight subjects was 
asked to go to a small individual cubicle along the outside 
wall of the main room. Once seated, the subjects were 
presented with a six-minute "slide show" presenting 
information about members of group X and group Y. As in the 
information-induction procedure, the slides consisted of a 
person's name, group membership, and a behavior that person 
engaged in. During this presentation, the number of 
positive and negative statements about Group X equaled the 
number of positive and negative statements about Group Y :
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of the 20 total statements given about each group, there 
were 15 positive and 5 negative statements.
When the subjects finished watching the "slide show" 
they were asked to return to their seating in the large main 
room. At this point, the experimenter administered the 
attitude assessment questionnaire a second time.
Cooperation/competition condition. In the sessions 
devoted to this condition, all eight subjects were asked to 
sit around one table. The experimenter assigned a specific 
seating arrangement (U X U Y U X U Y; with U= unclassified 
subject, X= member of group X, and Y= member of group Y ) . 
Subjects were asked to cooperate as a group for the best 
possible score on two tasks. Before beginning the tasks, 
the experimenter asked subjects to choose a new colored 
sticker for their overall group; a color different from 
blue, green or white. Following this, stickers of the 
chosen color were distributed and subjects were asked to 
affix them to the badges they currently were wearing. Then 
the experimenter asked the group to choose a name from two 
options supplied by the experimenters. Subjects were told 
that the name was for identification purposes. When this 
name is chosen, it was written on a movable white-board. 
Finally, the experimenter explained that this newly formed 
group was competing against all the other eight person 
groups that completed the experiment and that a visual log 
needed to be kept of all the groups. So, the eight members
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were asked to stand around the whiteboard, which had their 
group name written on it, and the experimenter took a group 
photograph. Following this, subjects were told that the 
eight-person group receiving the highest score on the tasks 
would have their picture displayed at the end of the 
semester, and, for that reason, the photograph was a 
necessity (these activities were all designed to heighten 
subjects' identification with the group).
The eight subjects then worked as a group on another 
task. The task was similar to the one used during the 
cooperation/competition induction procedure and involved 
being lost in the woods with only limited survival material 
(see Appendix E).
When the single answer sheet containing the group's 
responses had been collected, the experimenter asked 
subjects to return to their first seating arrangement (the 
chair they sat in when they first entered the room). This 
was done so that subjects would not sit together or change 
the overall seating arrangement. A second attitude 
assessment questionnaire was then administered to the 
subjects.
Debriefing. The subjects were fully debriefed about the 
experiment. The experimenters stressed that the so-called 
personality assessment tasks were meaningless and that the 
group categorization was purely random. At this point one 
experimenter gave the best solutions for any 'and all of the
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cooperation, task problems. The answers were given so that 
subjects could see how their responses compared against the 
correct ones. Next, the experimenter answered any 
questions, asked to subjects not to discuss the experiment 
and dismissed them.
Pilot Study
Before the full project was undertaken, a pilot study 
was completed to determine whether comparable group 
attitudes could be induced using the procedures specified in 
the overall methods section. Also, this pilot study 
investigated the utility of the dependent measure.
Subi ects
Subjects were 39 undergraduates at the University of 
Montana participating in the experiment for partial 
fulfillment of a class requirement. All subjects 
participated in single gender groups. The subjects 
participated in either the interaction-based induction 
condition or the information-based induction condition. 
Procedures
The procedures were the same as those described above 
except that the subjects did not receive an intervention 
phase. They were presented with either the information- 
based or the interaction-based induction materials. They 
were then asked to fill out the dependent measurement scale 
to assess their opinions about each group.
Results and Analysis
Internal consistency of attitude measure. The first 
goal of the pilot study was to determine the internal 
consistency of the attitude assessment scale. Because this 
scale was composed of revised questions from other 
experiments plus newly developed questions (see Appendix D),
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internal consistency was vital. This scale produced two 
separate scores: one for the ratings of Group X and one for 
ratings of Group Y. The internal consistency on this test 
was high: questions used for Group X -- Cronbach's alpha
=.89, questions used for Group Y -- Cronbach's alpha = .90).
Effects of prejudice induction procedures. After 
determining the internal consistency of the scale, the data 
were then entered into a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA 
(induction x group) to explore the differences more 
carefully. The results showed that the difference between 
the "good" group and the "bad" group was significant F(l,
38) = 12.74, p < .001 (see Table 2). It was also found that 
the overall ratings by subjects receiving the 
interaction-based induction procedure were significantly 
higher (representing more favorable impressions) than the 
ratings of subjects receiving the information-based 
induction procedure F(l, 37) = 13.06, p < .001. This 
effect was not expected from the hypothesis. However, the 
emphasis of the current research is on differences in 
attitudes toward both of the target groups. The difference 
in prejudice between the information-induction (M = .81) and 
the interaction-induction (M = .71) was minimal and not 
significant, F(l,37) =.172, p > .50.
Overall, the results of the pilot study support the 
predictions that similar prejudicial attitudes can be 
induced using the two procedures.
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Table 2
Ratincrs of the "Good" GrouD and the "
J  /
Bad" Group from the
Pilot Studv
Group Rating
Induction n "Good" "Bad" Difference
(prejudice)
Information 15 5.01 4.20 .81
Interaction 24 4 .49 3.78 .71




Due to the numerous situations and procedures each 
subject experienced, a complex system of counterbalancing 
was employed. The first set of analyses focused on the 
different types of counterbalancing used.
Each subject received material designed to create 
impressions of the target groups (Group X and Group Y). To 
counterbalance the material, half the subjects received a 
procedure designed to create a positive impression of Group 
X and a negative impression of Group Y. The remaining 
subjects received the opposite, a procedure designed to 
create a favorable impression of Group Y and a negative 
impression of Group X.
Two variables were created to control for this 
counterbalancing manipulation. These variables, which will 
be referred to (almost facetiously) as the "good" group 
rating and the "bad" group rating, encompassed the 
favorability ratings for the target groups, controlling for 
the counterbalancing manipulation.
Specifically, in the information-based condition, the 
group (Group X or Group Y) about which subjects received the 
most favorable material was considered the "good" group, and 
the other group (Group X or Group Y) was considered the 
"bad" group. In the interaction-based condition, the group 
(Group X or Group Y) for which subjects believed themselves
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to be members, will be considered the "good" group, and the 
other group (Group X or Group Y) - the "bad" group.
Note that the effects of this counterbalancing would 
emerge in the following manner. Subjects' could have rated 
one group more favorably than the other because something in 
the group's label appealed to them. For example, an 
anticipated yet non-desired possibility was that subjects 
would favor Group X simply because the letter X precedes the 
letter Y in the alphabet. Results showed that this effect 
did not occur in either the interaction-induction condition 
F (1, 98) < 1.0 or the information-induction condition F(l,
78) < 1.0.
Other counterbalancing manipulations were examined 
also. Because subjects in the information-induction 
condition received the material via computer, four different 
"slide-shows" were produced. No effects were found because 
of this manipulation F (3,76) < 1.0. Also, because 8 
different computers were used in this induction conditions, 
these potential computer/room effects were examined.
Results of this analysis showed that no room or computer 
effects were present F (7,85) < 1.0. Finally, an analysis 
was computed to determine whether experimenter effects 
existed for any of the induction Or persuasion conditions. 
None were found F (1,178) < 1.0.
Main Analysis
The main hypothesis was that subjects who create group
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prejudice through one means would reduce that prejudice only 
when another procedure engaged the same cognitive mechanisms 
that initially formed it. For example, once subjects formed 
group prejudice through an interaction-based induction 
procedure, they would reduce that prejudice only when 
presented with an interaction-based persuasion procedure. 
Therefore, the initial formation of group prejudice was an 
essential prerequisite for testing the hypothesis.
To test this, a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA 
(induction x group rating) was performed on the first 
ratings of favorability taken before the persuasion 
condition. This showed a significant interaction F (1,178)
= 5.82, p <.025 that, when further analyzed, indicated that 
subjects in the interaction-induction condition rated 
members of the "good" group more favorably than members of 
the "bad" group F (1,99) =37.53, p <.001. However, 
subjects' ratings of the target groups did not differ in the 
information-induction condition F (1,79) = 1.02, p > .05.
Unfortunately, this suggests that the hypothesis can be 
tested only on the data from subjects receiving the 
interaction-based induction procedure. It was in this 
condition, and only this condition, that prejudice was 
initially formed.
A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2  repeated-measures ANOVA (Induction x 
Persuasion x Time x Group Rating) was performed on the data. 
It was predicted that a significant 4-way interaction would
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emerge. This would result from changes in prejudice from 
Time 1 to Time 2 in those conditions where the persuasion 
condition was most similar to the induction condition 
(interaction ind. -- interaction per. and information ind. - 
- information per.). Also, in conditions in which the 
persuasion was different from the induction, no change in 
prejudice was expected. This 4-way interaction was not 
significant F(l, 176) < 1.0.
Three main effects were found. The first was an effect 
of group favoritism. Across all conditions, subjects rated 
the "good" group (M =4.68) more favorably than the "bad" 
group (M = 4.44), F(l, 176) = 21.13, p < .001.
Figure 1 presents the data for all subjects in both 
induction and persuasion conditions. It can be seen that 
the ratings of the "good" group were consistently higher 
than those of the "bad" group, allowing this main effect to 
be interpreted despite any interactions.
An effect of induction also emerged. The ratings of 
both target groups (both "good" and "bad") were higher in 
the interaction-induction group (M = 4.63) than in the 
information-induction group (M = 4.46), F(l, 176) = 5.62, p 
< .05. This replicates the effect obtained in the pilot 
study.
Lastly, an effect was found for persuasion condition. 
Subjects in the information-persuasion condition rated both 
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Subjects' mean favorability ratings of the "good" group and 
the "bad" group across induction and persuasion conditions.
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the interaction-persuasion condition (M = 4.48), F(l, 176)
= 4.01, p < .05.
The effect of group favoritism was anticipated. Given 
the results of the pilot study, the main effect of induction 
was also unsurprising. However, the main effect of 
persuasion was unexpected. These effects do not influence 
the testability of the hypothesis. Therefore, they will not 
be discussed further.
One interaction emerged from this analysis. There was 
a significant induction x time x group favoritism 
interaction F(l, 176) = 7.57, p < .05. This was further 
analyzed by performing two 2 x 2  (time X group favoritism) 
repeated-measures ANOVA^s, one for each level of induction.
A significant time x group favoritism interaction was found 
for subjects receiving the interaction-induction procedure 
F (1, 99) = 13.56, p < .001. An examination of these effects 
showed that subjects initially rated the "good" group higher 
than the "bad" group. Following both persuasion procedures 
(information and interaction), subjects changed their 
ratings of the groups such that the disparity between 
ratings of "good" and "bad" groups was decreased. Note, 
however, that this disparity decreased about equally in both 
persuasion conditions -- this fails to support the "process 
specificity hypothesis."
No change due to persuasion was found for subjects 
receiving the information-induction procedure F(l, 79) <
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1.0, suggesting that the subjects' ratings of the "good" 
group and the "bad" group did not change. Remember that the 
initial ratings of the "good" group and the "bad" group did 
not differ in this condition. Thus, it is not surprising 
that the interaction was not significant.
Ancillary Analyses
Additional repeated-measures ANOVA's were performed to 
determine how subjects reduced the disparity between ratings 
of the "good" group and the "bad" group. This analysis 
tested the conceptual question of how subjects reduce 
prejudice. Did they increase ratings of the disparaged 
group or decrease ratings of the favored group? Perhaps a 
combination of both would emerge.
The previous analysis suggested that this additional 
examination was warranted only for subjects receiving the 
interaction-induction procedure. Only in this condition did 
the ratings of the "good" group and the "bad" group 
significantly differ following the induction procedure.
Subjects receiving the interaction-persuasion procedure 
did not significantly reduce their ratings of the "good" 
group, F (1, 47) = 1.50, ns. However, there was a near­
significant trend toward subjects rating the "bad" group 
more positively F(l, 47) = 3.37, p = .07.
Similar results were found in those subjects receiving 
the information-persuasion procedure. Subjects' ratings 
of the "good" group did not change F(l, 51) = 1.05,ns.
45
But, ratings of the "bad" group did become more positive 
F(l, 51) * 5.33, p < .05.
Personal need for structure. Subjects were classified 
as having high or low personal need for structure. To 
accomplish this, the median was determined (4.0), and a 
median split was performed. Subjects with scores lower than 
4.0 were considered low PNS, and subjects with scores higher 
than 4.0 were considered high PNS. Seven subjects' scores 
feil on the median, and these subjects were subsequently- 
omitted from the analysis.
As with the previous analysis, the investigation of PNS 
focussed on subjects who received the interaction-based 
induction condition. To test whether PNS had any main 
effect, or moderated effects of other variables, a 2 x 2 x 2 
x 2 (persuasion condition x group rating x time x PNS) 
repeated-measures ANOVA was performed.
Only one effect emerged that involved PNS: A 3-way 
interaction of persuasion condition by time by PNS F(l» 92) 
=4.14, p < .05. Two additional 2 x 2  (time x PNS) 
repeated-measures ANOVAs were performed to investigate this 
finding more closely, one for each persuasion condition.
For those subjects receiving the information-based 
persuasion procedure, level of PNS did not influence the 
results. However, it emerged as an important factor in 
subjects receiving the interaction-based persuasion 
procedure.
Figure 2 presents the data for both low and high PNS 
subjects receiving the interaction-induction procedure with 
an interaction-persuasion procedure. These subjects 
appeared to reduce the disparity between the ratings of the 
"good" group and the "ba”d" group in different ways dependent 
upon PNS. The results of the 2 x 2  repeated-measures ANOVA 
indicated that level of PNS influenced how subjects reduced 
prejudice. A significant PNS-split by time interaction was 
found F (1, 44) = 12.34, p < .001. This suggested that level 
of PNS influenced the way that subjects reduced prejudice.
To examine this more closely, additional analysis 
showed that low-PNS subjects rated the "good" group less 
positively following the persuasion F(l, 28) = 5.83, p <
.05. They did not, however, change their ratings of the 
"bad" group F(l, 28) < 1.0. High-PNS subjects appeared to 
increase the ratings of both groups. Ratings of the "good" 
group significantly increased F(l, 16) = 8.04, p < .05, as 
did ratings of the "bad" group F(l, 16) = 5.40, p < .05.
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Mean favorability ratings of the "good" group and the "bad" 
group for subjects scoring high or low on personal need for 
structure. This figure represents subjects who received an 
interaction-induction with an interaction persuasion.
Discussion
The main hypothesis was that once subjects formed 
impressions about groups in one fashion, any successful 
attempt to change these impressions must engage the same 
mechanisms that initially formed them. For the hypothesis 
to be fully tested, it was important that subjects form 
prejudice following the induction procedures. Although 
overall ratings of the "good" group were more favorable than 
those of the "bad" group, this initial prejudice effect was 
found in the interaction-induction condition only. Thus, a 
test of the hypothesis could occur only within this 
interaction-induction condition.
Subjects Receiving the Interaction-induction
The hypothesis stated that subjects, having formed 
prejudice, would reduce it only when presented with an 
interaction-based persuasion procedure. This procedure was 
designed to be as similar to the induction as possible. 
Therefore prejudice should have been reduced following this 
procedure, which did occur. However, an unanticipated 
effect emerged. Those subjects receiving the interaction- 
based persuasion procedure also reduced their prejudice in 
an equally powerful manner. This effect did not conform to 
the primary hypothesis because prejudice was reduced equally 
whether subjects received a superordinate-group intervention 




Consider two possible implications of these results. 
First, the primary hypothesis may be wrong. Although this 
hypothesis was similar to that conceived of by Edwards 
(1990), differences do exist. Edwards (1990) created 
impressions of objects by varying the order in which 
subjects received an affectively-laden slide or written 
information. Thus, in Edwards' study, subjects formed 
impressions about objects rather than groups. Perhaps the 
formation of group impressions or prejudice is processed 
differently than the impressions of tangible objects. In 
fact, research and theory by Srull and Wyer (1989) suggest 
that memory for groups differs from memory for objects.
Their theory is based on an associative network model of 
memory in which behaviors and attributes are mentally 
represented by nodes. Each node is associated with other, 
similar nodes, by means of mental connections. When an 
individual activates a certain node, the others directly 
connected to it also become activated. This elicits the 
memory of an event, person or object.
Srull and Wyer (1989) suggest that when people have 
expectations about a particular group, two separate mental 
representations are produced. The first links behaviors and 
traits, and the second links behaviors and an overall 
evaluation of the person or group. The presence of these 
dual-links suggests that encoding group impressions is more 
complex than impressions formed with single-links, such as
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impressions of objects. Therefore, since the encoding of 
group impressions may differ from the encoding of object 
impressions, the future processing of each impression may 
differ also. These considerations may account for the 
failure to find a process-specificity result analogous to 
that found by Edwards (1990).
Another possibility is that the conceptual hypothesis 
is correct but the conditions created for testing it were 
inadequate. Subjects formed only immediate impressions of 
both groups. Previous research has suggested that time is 
an important factor in impressions development (Hovland, 
Janis, & Kelly, 1953; Sherif et al., 1954). Intuitively, it 
seems that real-world prejudice does not occur overnight. 
Following an initial encounter with the target group (be it 
through information or interaction), an individual sustains
Iand develops this prejudice through time. The theory behind 
associative network models of memory explains why time is a 
factor. These theories suggest that, once the material has 
been mentally encoded in nodes, initial links will connect 
each node. Each time the nodes are activated (i.e. the 
person remembers the event), more links are created between 
the nodes. This idea of alternative retrieval routes 
suggests that the memory of the event will be enhanced 
because of the development of these additional links 
(Anderson, 1990) . Thus, time will serve to strengthen and 
solidify a newly formed prejudice. For this reason, the
51
primary process-specificity hypothesis may be correct, but 
the prejudice formed in this study was not of the same 
caliber as real-world prejudice, resulting in a failure to 
support this hypothesis.
In either case, the primary hypothesis was not 
supported. But the methods did allow for a test of some 
ancillary hypotheses that were, in themselves, interesting.
Previous work (Gaertner et al.,1990) suggests that 
interaction-based interventions reduce interaction-based 
prejudice by increasing the favorability of the formerly 
disparaged outgroup. In fact, the results of the current 
study replicated this finding within that condition.
But, past work has not offered any indication how 
subjects would reduce interaction-based prejudice when 
presented with an information-based intervention. Would 
they do so in the same manner as subjects receiving the 
interaction-intervention? Apparently, yes: the same pattern 
of prejudice reduction emerged within both conditions. This 
suggests that information depicting both groups as 
equivalent reduces categorization-based prejudice primarily 
through changing perceptions of the disparaged outgroup, 
rather than changing perceptions of the ingroup.
Although most of the "action" was in perceptions of the 
"bad" outgroup, subjects, in both conditions exhibited slight 
decreases in the perceived favorability of the "good" group. 
This was not a significant drop, and yet, it is worth
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considering why it would happen. One possibility is that 
subjects were less confident about their initial ratings of 
each group following the interventions. This is evidenced 
through the reduction of prejudice that occurred. Along 
with changing their perceptions of the disparaged group, 
subjects may have felt that a more tempered, less 
enthusiastic response was justified in their perception of 
the favored group ("good" group). Thus, they decreased the 
favorability ratings of this group.
Personal Need for Structure (PNS)
Because Personal Need for Structure was an ancillary 
variable, no specific predictions of its influence on the 
results were made. However, one possibility, suggested by 
the conceptualization of PNS (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993), was 
that high PNS subjects would be less apt to reduce prejudice 
following any persuasion procedure. Because of their desire 
for clear, set boundaries, these people would not choose to 
modify their existing cognitive structures (stereotypes and 
prejudicial beliefs) when approached with new material.
The results showed no support for this hypothesis. 
Generally, PNS did not moderate the effects of prejudice 
reduction, and no broader effects of PNS occurred across 
conditions. However, one interesting result emerged within 
one experimental condition. PNS influenced the way 
prejudice was reduced among subjects who received the 
interaction- induction with an interaction-persuasion.
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Subjects high in PNS exhibited prejudice reduction in a 
way similar to that observed by Gaertner et al. (1990). 
Although these people increased the favorability ratings of 
both groups, the magnitude of increase was greater for the 
"bad" outgroup. In contrast, among low PNS subjects, 
favorability ratings of the "bad" outgroup remained 
constant, but ratings of the "good" ingroup became less 
favorable.
Why subjects with differing levels of PNS responded as 
they did remains open to speculation. The correlations of 
PNS with other personality constructs may suggest one 
possible reason.
Previous research suggests that PNS is positively 
correlated with depressive symptomatology (Mikulincer, Yinon
& Kabili, 1991) and social anxiety (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993).
This indicates that PNS may be associated with an 
individual's self-esteem. In fact, preliminary research by 
Schaller (1993) found that PNS was negatively correlated 
with self-esteem, r = -.38, p < .05.
As Tajfel et al. (1971) suggest, self-esteem may play a 
critical role in the way individuals perceive their social 
environment. Social identity theory suggests that an 
individual would be more likely to embrace their ingroup if 
they felt socially threatened. In fact, other research 
suggests that a threatened self-esteem will cause
individuals to favor their ingroup more (Cialdini &
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Richardson, 1980; Finchilescu, 1986).
Therefore, it's possible that because of lower self­
esteem, subjects high in PNS were more resistant to viewing 
their group in a less than favorable way. However, subjects 
low in PNS (and thus higher in self-esteem) may have been 
less resistant to perceiving their own group to be less 
favorable. Therefore they may have felt comfortable in 
reducing prejudice in this manner.
Subjects Receiving the Information-Induction Procedure
The results relevant to subjects in the information- 
induction conditions are statistically straightforward -- 
nothing happened. Although subjects did rate the "good" 
group more favorably than the "bad" group overall, this was 
not moderated by either persuasion procedure. Note that 
this effect was similar to one found by Edwards (1990). In
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that experiment, no differential processing occurred in the 
subjects receiving a cognitive induction. The implications 
of this effect are that object impressions formed through 
cognitive means and group prejudice formed through 
information-based procedures may both contain large 
affective and cognitive components. Thus, by storing these 
impressions as multi-dimensional psychological structures 
they may prove easily changed by or extremely resistant to 
any type of intervention.
One difference between the Edwards (1990) study and the 
current one was a marginal effect of the interaction-
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intervention on subjects receiving this information- 
induction procedure. In fact, surprisingly, there was a 
non-significant tendency for the interaction-intervention 
actually to amplify, rather than reduce, the initial 
prejudice F(l, 38) = 2.28, p = .14. Why would this be so?
It's possible that the information-induction procedure 
acted as a seed for future processing of the target groups. 
Subjects may have formed tentative impressions of the target 
groups that they were unwilling to express on the rating 
scales. However, following the interaction-persuasion, they 
used the additional knowledge gained through interpersonal 
cooperation to solidify their opinions. In essence, 
presentation of the initial information served to bias the 
subjects. This bias was not exhibited in the initial 
ratings of the group but manifested later, after subjects 
had an opportunity to confirm initial, tentative 
inclinations during their interaction with the target group 
members.
If additional research finds a similar effect, then it 
would appear that prejudice was not being reduced through 
direct intergroup contact as postulated by the contact 
hypothesis (Allport, 1954). In fact, research on the 
contact hypothesis suggests that certain conditions must be 
met for prejudice reduction to occur through intergroup 
contact (Cook, 1985). In the present experiment, it 
appeared that four of five necessary conditions were met:
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Subjects were of equal status, worked cooperatively to 
complete the goal, interacted in an informally structured 
environment, and seemed to view each other as typical of 
members of the other group (at least to the best of my 
knowledge). However, it is questionable whether the group 
contact occurred within a setting where the existing norms 
favored equality. If, as suggested, the initial, biasing 
information served as a seed for future processing, then 
this could influence these norms. Instead of looking at 
each group equally, they were searching to confirm initial 
perceptions of inequality. Thus, they were constrained by a 
desire to confirm their tenuous impressions of the groups. 
Caveats and Comments
The goal of this study was to create and then remove 
group prejudice. Because of the failure of the primary 
hypothesis and the existence of many unpredicted effects, 
certain questions remain unanswered.
For example, prejudice was operationalized as the 
different favorability ratings of two novel groups.
Although this worked for the current study, it does not 
fully capture the concept of group prejudice. One reason is 
that real-world prejudice often tends to be based on many 
years or decades of experience. Thus, the existence of a 
disparity between the ratings of two target groups (deemed 
prejudice for the purposes of this study) can not compare to 
a prejudicial attitude held for many years. It is possible
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that given longer periods of interaction or more potent 
group classifications that the resultant group impressions 
would become more resilient. Perhaps only certain 
procedures would successfully change well-entrenched group 
impressions. Future research should attempt to create and 
maintain these impressions to ensure that they are well- 
formed before attempting to change them.
Another question is: why didn't subjects form initial 
prejudice following the information-induction procedure?
This lack of effect was surprising, given that the effect 
did occur in the pilot study. Besides the possibility of an 
unfortunate fluke, another reason for the discontinuity may 
lie in a subtle methodological difference between the pilot 
study and the main experiment. In the main experiment, 
subjects in the information-induction condition were told 
that they were unclassifiable, and that they would be 
classified as member of Group X or Group Y later in the 
experiment. This may have caused subjects to refrain from 
"slamming" either group, as they may find out they were 
members of it later.
If this is a reason why subjects failed to form 
prejudice, it could be easily corrected by having subjects 
be members of a different group, say Group G.
Clearly, this study raises more questions than it has 
answers, identifies more problems than solutions. There is 
not a magical cure for the "disease" of prejudice. However,
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the present study does indicate some directions for future 
research that may offer insights into the ways to combat 
this "plague."
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When you call subjects ask them to participate in the 
Knowledge of People experiment. The experiment will be 
worth 2 units for their Psychology 100 class. Remember, we 
will be running single gender groups - only men or only 
women.
All normal subjects should go to room PhP 242, All 
alternate subjects should go to room PhP 320. Tell subjects 
that they must be at the rooms by 5 after the hour or they 
will be docked the units. Make this very clear to them so 
they will not be late.
Write the name of the subject on the calling sheet. Be 
sure to sign up 10 subjects total (8 normal subjects and 2 
alternates)
Tell the alternates that they are alternates for this 
experiment. That means that they will participate only if 
other subjects to not show up. Tell them that if the normal 
subjects show up, the alternates will receive 1 unit for 
showing up and be allowed the opportunity to sign up for the 
experiment again. Therefore, they could get a total of 3 
units for this experiment (1 unit for showing up as an 





The script should look something like this:
Subjects will be ushered into room 242 by the experimenters 
and placed at different locations by the experiments. 
Remember that the two alternates will be standing outside 
room 320.
At 5 minutes after the hour, the experimenters will 
assess how many subjects have arrived. If the alternates 
are needed then the experimenter will retrieve them to fill 
out the 8 people. If all 8 normal subjects show up, the 
experimenter will go to the alternates, give them 1 credit 
and ask them to sign up for another time. Alternates will 
not be reassigned to another alternate position -- they get 
first crack at a normal position.
Note: the experiment can be run with 6, 7 or 8 people.
If it is 5 minutes after the hour and there are only 6 
people there, wait for 2 or 3 minutes longer to see if more 
people show up. If they do not, run the experiment, and use 
the 6-people assignment in the assignment sheet. If only 5 
people show up, give them all one unit for showing up and 
ask them to sign up for another time.
When an acceptable number of subjects are seated. The 
prime experimenter will go to the front of the room and 
welcome the subjects. The experimenter should say:
Welcome to the Knowledge of People experiment. My name 
is___________ . and this is________ ;____  We will be the
experimenters for this research. Feel free to ask us any
questions you may have regarding the experiment.
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The first thing we ask you to do is print your name. 
Psychology 100 section number, and your TA's name on the 
experimental credit sheet. This way we can be sure you 
receive the units for this experiment.
Pass around the credit sheet and make sure all subjects 
print their name, sections number and TA's name on the line 
provided.
Okay, now I'll tell you a little more about the 
experiment. We are looking at how individuals with a
personality trait perform on a variety of different 
tasks. This personality trait, call asymbollism. is not one 
that represents some a troublesome characteristic -- instead 
it is one that most people tend to have to one degree or 
another and is of interest to this research.
The way we assessed asymbollism was through a series of 
questions you filled out on February 3 at the Psychology 100 
screening. Contained within the questionnaires were 
questions which allowed us to classify vou as belonging to 
one of three categories. Each of you either: A) possesses 
the personality trait in question. B) definitely does not 
possess the personality trait, or C) could not be classified 
as possessing or not possessing the trait.
The reason some of you are unclassified is because the 
questions from the screening do not make fine 
discriminations possible. Therefore, for the unclassified
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people, your scores fell somewhere in the middle on the 
personality trait -- vou were neither high enough to 
definitely possess the trait nor low enough to not possess 
the trait. However, this does not mean you do not fall into 
one of the two groups, we simply need more testing to 
determine whether you possess the trait. In fact, closer to 
the end of the experiment we will ask you fill out another 
questionnaire so we can see if you possess the trait of 
asymbollism or not. For now, though, that distinction is 
not important.
Oh. once again I want to point out that this trait is 
not something bad. I want to stress that possessing or not 
possessing this trait is in no way a predictor of an kind of 
problem.
Note: if subject ask why we don't care about whether
they possess the trait or not, just tell them we are 
interested in them as people who fall in the middle; people 
in the grey area between possessing the trait and not.
After reading the above information, give out the 
classifications as determined by the list. However, 
remember to go to the front of the room and pretend to check 
the computer printout so subjects will believe we have an 
overall list of their names and classifications.
Okay, now we will hand out the group memberships. I 
ask each of you to take a colored tag and write your name on 
it. As vou can see, there are 8 name tags. 4 white. 2 blue
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and 2 green. Using the information collected from the
screening, we could call the proper amount of subjects to be 
in each group. Therefore. 4 of you are unclassified. 2 
definitely posses the trait and 2 definitely do not possess 
the trait. The white tags are for the individuals who are 
unclassified. To remove any bias. I will not be telling the 
classified subjects whether they possess the trait or not. 
Therefore, they will be referred to as members of either 
Group X or Group Y. Now, before I call everyone up to get 
a nametag. please remember where vou are sitting. I will be 
asking you to return to these seats later in the experiment.
If you are in Group X. please come up and take a blue 
tag, write vour name on it and stand over in this area. If 
you are in Group Y. take a green tag, write your name on it 
and stand over in this area. Those people who are 
unclassified, take a white tag, write your name on it and 
stand in the back. Are there any question?
Feel free to answer any questions concerning the 
procedures. Remember not to give anything away, but make 
sure they understand where they should be and what they 
should do. The most important thing is to have each subject 
get a name tag, write their name on it, put it on their 
clothes and be seated at the correct table. Move subjects 
to the proper tables if needed. Remember that they are 
looking for you to give them instructions about what to do. 
You may have to be very basic in the things you tell them,
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but it is important they are not overly confused.
At this point we should be ready to start the main 
experiment. One of the experimenters must take the 
classified subjects up to room 320 while the other handles 
the remaining unclassified subjects in room 242.
To conduct the experiment, we need to take some of you 
to a different room. At this time I (or the other 
experimenter) ask all the members of Group X and Group Y to 
follow me. Feel free to leave your things here as we will 
be returning to this room shortly. The remaining■ III !"■ !■■■■■—    ————
unclassified subjects will stay in this room with me (or the■ 
other experimenter).
Now one experimenter takes the classified subjects up 
to room 320 and leads them in. Once they are all inside 
room 320, the experimenter will place the members of Group X 
in the back room and the members of Group Y in the front 
room. Feel free to alternate which group is placed in the 
back or front of room 320.
Experimenter in Room 320 
For this part of the experiment. I ask that you all 
work in the team for which you are members, either Team X or 
Team Y. You will receive a score for your team. This score 
will be compared, not only against the members of the other 
group here today, but also an overall score for all the 
people, who have participated in this experiment, in Team X 
will be compared to an overall score for all the people in
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Team Y. So. please try to do vour best.
This task is fairly challenging and will require both 
members of each team working together to get the best score.
Here are the instructions for the task. < HAND EACH GROUP 
ONE OF THE COLORED INSTRUCTION SHEETS AND READ THE 
INSTRUCTIONS WHILE THEY FOLLOW ALONG -- AFTER YOU HAVE 
FINISHED CONTINUE > In a couple of minutes. I will be 
handing out the answer sheets for this task. Each of your 
teams will have 3 minutes to rate all the items for their 
importance. When the time is up. I will collect the sheets 
and score them. Then I will tell both teams their 
respective scores. At that time, vou will have a chance to 
better your score. I will return the answer sheets for 2 
minutes. At that time you mav change your item rankings in 
an attempt to better your scores. After this second try, 
both teams will again receive feedback from me regarding vou 
score and then they will have a third attempt to better 
their scores. However, you will only have one minute to do 
so. Are there anv questions before I hand out the ranking 
sheets?
At this time, hand out the ranking sheets and start 
timing the teams. Be sure to partially close the door 
between the two groups -- this will give the teams more 
privacy. Time the teams for 3 minutes. When 3 minutes have 
past, collect the rankings and pretend to score them. 
Remember that the scores you tell the subjects will come
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from the book. Announce the scores for each team.
Hand back the ranking sheets and tell them they have 2 
minutes to rerank the items. Collect the sheets and pretend 
to score. Announce the second scores from the book (UNLESS 
A TEAM HAS NOT CHANGED ANY ANSWERS -- THEN IMPROVISE THE 
SCORES AND KEEP A RECORD IN THE JOURNAL) Hand back the 
ranking sheets and time for 1 minute, collect, rescore and 
then announce:
Your final, overall score takes into account the number 
of changes vou have made and the correctness of vour last 
ranking. Therefore, it will take a while to figure out 
which team ranked the items most correctly. In the 
meantime, please collect any personal items vou may have and 
follow me.
Lead the subjects back to room 242 and have them be 
seated in the chair they originally sat in at the beginning 
of the experiment.
Experimenter in Room 242
In this part of the experiment, you will receive 
general information about members of Group X and Group Y. 
Please attempt to get a feeling for the members in Group X 
and Group Y based on this information. This will be 
presented bv the computer. All I ask you to do is go into 
one of the small cubicles around the side of the room, be 
seated comfortably, and press the ENTER key once. The 
program is automatic and vou will not need to press any
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other keys. Read each statement silently as it is presented
and attempt to understand each group from this information. 
Now I will assign you to the individual cubicles.
When everyone is seated, ask them to press the enter 
key to begin the program. Stress that they need to press 
the enter key only once for the program to run.
At the end of the program, ask the subject to return to 
the seats they originally were seated when they entered the 
room. Wait for the members of the second group to return.
Everyone Back in Room 242 
Now that everyone is back, we ask that you fill out a 
simple 4 page questionnaire. Try to fill this out as best 
you can. Some of the questions may be difficult to answer, 
but attempt to answer each one based on your feelings and 
information. You may be asked to fill out questionnaires a 
couple different times during the experiment. We do this so 
we can pick up any subtle changes in attitude through the 
experiment.
Hand out the attitude assessment questionnaire and make 
sure all the subjects fill it out. Collect the 
questionnaires when the subjects are finished with them and 
write their ID number at the top of their questionnaire.
Information Condition 
All subjects in this condition will be receiving 
information about Groups X and Group Y. The procedures will 
be similar to those described above.
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For the next part of the experiment. we will ask you to 
be seated in front of computers and receive additional 
information about the members of Groups X and Group Y. For 
some of you, this will be similar to the task you iust
completed. Please read all the statements silently and
attempt to get a better understanding for the members of 
Group X and Group Y. In a couple of moments, we will be 
splitting vou into the individual cubicles you see around 
the room. Because we do not have enough computers for 
everyone, two of vou will be escorted up to room 320 to 
receive the information there. Once you are seated in front 
of the computer. I will give the signal to press the enter 
key once. The program is automatic and you need not press 
any other keys. At that time, watch the slide show to the 
end and then I will give further instructions.
Take two subjects up to room 320, preferably those 
subjects who were stuck in room 242 for the information 
induction. These people will not have been out of the room. 
Do not choose the subjects who just came down from room 320 
as they may get annoyed at having to return.
When the slide show is over, have all subjects return 
to the seats they originally started from at the beginning 
and prepare for the last attitude assessment.
Interaction Condition
For these folks, the cooperation condition is similar 
to the one that Group X and Group Y just completed. At this
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point, all subjects will be in the room and seated at their 
original starting seats.
In this part of the experiment, we are interested in 
how people interact to solve different tasks, and if the 
interactions are effective. Therefore, we wish to see how 
well all 8 of you can complete a given task. At this time.
(the other experimenter) and I will seat you around 
this large table. < SEAT SUBJECTS IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER 
(UXUYUXUY) AROUND THE LARGE TABLE >
Because you will all be competing against the other 8- 
person groups participating in this experiment, vou will 
need a group identification. Therefore, we ask you to 
choose your preferences on a few items. First of all. you 
will need a new color for your team, would you like red or 
yellow badges < WAIT FOR CHOICE AND THEN DISTRIBUTE THE 
COLOR CHOSEN -- ASK SUBJECT TO ATTACH THE BADGES ABOVE THE 
ONES THEY ALREADY HAVE > Another thing you will need is a 
name. do you wish to be the Wolves or the Falcons. < WHEN 
SUBJECTS CHOOSE A NAME. WRITE IT ON THE MOVABLE WHITE-BOARD 
AND PREPARE FOR THE PHOTO >
The last thing we want is a way of giving credit when 
the group with the highest score is found. For this we will 
be taking a photo of vour group with the group name featured 
in it. We will be placing the photo outside PhP 213 so that 
all subjects who participated in this experiment will be 
able to see which group achieved the best score on the test.
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Are their any questions before we take the photo?
< IF THERE ARE NO QUESTIONS. TAKE THE PHOTO AND PLACE THE 
WHITE-BOARD WITHIN VIEW OF THE SUBJECTS >
Now we can move on to the task. This task will be 
very similar to the one that some of you iust finished.
Here is an instruction sheet, feel free to read silently as 
I read the directions out loud. < READ THE DIRECTIONS FOR 
THE TASK > In a couple of moments I will be handing out 
the item ranking sheet. Work as a group to decide which 
items are the most important. Initially you will have 3 
minutes to rank the items. At that time I will score the 
items and return them to you for a second try. You will 
have 2 minutes for the second try. Following that. I again 
will score your responses and return the sheet for a final 
trv. But you will only have 1 minute to complete this last 
attempt.
At this time hand out the item response sheets and time 
subjects as they complete the task. Follow this with the 
second attempt and finally the third. Remember that for the 
first two attempts, the scores you tell subjects are from 
the instructors book and not their actual scores. When the 
subjects finish the third attempt, say:
Your final score depends upon vour first two attempts 
and the correctness of your final ranking. Therefore, it 
will take me a few minutes to complete the scoring. In the 
meantime, please return to your original seats, the ones you
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sat in when you arrived. < WAIT UNTIL SUBJECTS ARE SEATED >
While I'm correcting the answer sheets, please fill out this 
questionnaire again. Try to answer each question as best 
vou can with the knowledge you have. The reason we ask the 
same questions is that in many situations an individual's 
responses change when they have acquired new information. 
Take as much time as you need to complete the questionnaire.
Have one experimenter pretend to be working on the 
answer sheets (In fact, this experimenter should leave the 
room to ostensibly complete the scoring at another location) 
and the other pass out the questionnaires. While subjects 
are working on the questionnaire, ask them to place the 
questionnaire face down in front of them when they are done. 
When everyone has completed the questionnaire, say:
We still have a few minutes before the other 
experimenter is finished with the scoring. I have another 
question that I would appreciate your response to.
Sometimes experiments, like this one, are talked about among 
the psychology 100 students. Although we would like to see 
subjects coming into an experiment with no previous 
knowledge of the upcoming procedures, we realize this does 
occur. At this time, you all have the experimental credit 
for this experiment. Therefore, it would benefit us greatly 
if you would write down what you heard or knew about this 
experiment before you ran through it. This would greatly 
help us to analyze the data and further this project.
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Because this is anonymous, we will not be able to trace the 
names to the people nor will we penalize anyone for 
disclosing that they were aware of some or all of the 
procedures. Take some time to answer this on the back of 
vour questionnaire.
When the other experimenter returns to the room, the 
first experimenter will begin the debriefing.
Thank you for being so patient in filling out the 
questionnaires and answering the questions. I have iust a 
couple of more questions to ask you. Below what you have 
written on the back of the questionnaire, please put an 
number 1. After this, please write down your thoughts on 
the personality trait of asybollism we were investigating. < 
AFTER EVERYONE IS DONE >
Debriefing
In fact, completion of the last question was the end of 
the experiment. There are some things I have to tell you 
about the experiment. In actuality, this experiment is 
testing to see how people form impressions about groups.
The truth is that each of you is not in a particular 
group due to questions you filled out during the screening; 
you were randomly assigned to be in Group X. Group Y or 
unclassified. This is because there is no personality 
variable named asymbollism that we are looking at. This 
small deception was necessary to achieve the control needed 
in this experiment. The scientific benefits were carefully
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weighted before this experiment was allowed to continue. It 
was determined that the benefits justified the small 
deception.
We assigned you to different groups to see if vou would 
form impressions about Groups X and Y in different ways.
Some of you were asked to form impressions by watching a 
computer present information about the two groups. Other 
subjects were asked to interact with people from, what they 
considered to be. the other group. We are investigating 
whether the way that attitudes form influence how 
individuals later think about a particular group.
< SAY THIS NEXT SENTENCE ONLY IF SUBJECTS PARTICIPATED IN 
THE INTERACTION CONDITION >
In addition to this, there is no competition going on. 
nor will vour photo be displayed outside PhP 213.
If you have any concerns about this research please 
feel free to talk to me after the experiment. If vou wish 
to talk to my supervisor, you may call or write Dr. Mark 
Schaller. Psychology Dept. U. of Montana. His telephone 
number is 243-4371. Feel free to contact him with any 
concerns vou may have about this experiment.
Are there any questions at this time? If not. I have 
a request. This research has taken many months to devise 
and formulate. It is very important that your classmates do 
not know the real reason behind what we are looking at. I
ask you, please, do not tell your friends what this is
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about. If they ask, please tell them something like : "It
has to do with the ways that groups interact" It is very 
important that we keep this secret, can we count on your 
help for that?
Now I will go through the correct answers to the 
ranking that each of you did. Some of vou did not have this 
ranking task to do. therefore you may leave if you wish.
< GO THROUGH ANSWERS, ASK FOR QUESTIONS -- IF NONE, 
DISMISS THE SUBJECTS >
Appendix B 
NASA Team Exercise
You are a member of a space crew originally scheduled 
to rendezvous with a mother ship on the lighted surface of 
the moon. Due to mechanical difficulties,- however, you ship 
was forced to land at a spot some 200 miles from the 
rendezvous point. During landing, much of the equipment 
aboard was damaged, and, since survival depends on reaching 
the mother ship, the most critical items available must be 
chosen for the 200-mile trip. Below are listed the fifteen 
items left intact and undamaged after landing. Your task is 
to rank order them in terms of their importance to your crew 
in allowing them to reach the rendezvous point. Place the 
number 1 by the most important item, the number 2 by the 
second most important, and so on, through number 15,the 
least important.
This is an exercise in group decision-making. Your 
group is to employ the method of Group Consensus in reaching 
its decision. This means that the prediction for each of 
the fifteen survival items must be agreed upon by each group 
member before it becomes a part of the group decision. 
Consensus is difficult to reach. Therefore, not every 
ranking will meet with everyone's complete approval. Try, 
as a group, to make each ranking one with which all group 
members can at least partially agree. Here are some guides 
to use in reaching consensus:
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(1) Avoid arguingfor your own individual judgments. 
Approach the task on the basis of logic.
(2) Avoid changing your mind only in order to reach 
agreement and avoid conflict. Support only 
solutions with which you are able to agree 
somewhat, at least.
(3) Avoid "conflict-reducing" techniques such as 
majority vote, averaging, or trading in reaching 
your decision.
(4) View differences of opinion as helpful rather than 
as a hindrance in decision-making.
Rank the following items according to their importance 
to your survival, starting with 1 for the most important one 
and proceeding to 15 for the least important one.
Item Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3
Box of matches ______  ______  _____ _
Food concentrate_________ ______  ______  ______
50 feet of nylon rope ______  ______  ______
Parachute silk ______  ______  ______
Portable heating unit ______ _̂_____ ______  ______
Two .45 calibre pistols ______  _______ ______
One case dehydrated     ,
milk
Two 100-lb. tanks of ______  ' ______
oxygen




5 gallons of water 
Signal flares 





Personal Need for Structure Scale 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much 
you agree with each according to your attitudes, beliefs, 
and experiences. Place your rating in the space to the left 









  1. It upsets me to go into a situations without
knowing what I can expect from it.
 _____ 2. I'm not bothered by things that interrupt my
daily routine.
  3. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of
life.
  4. I like to have a place for everything and
everything in its place.
  5. I enjoy being spontaneous.
  6. I find that a well-ordered life with regular
hours makes my life tedious.
  7. I don't like situations that are uncertain.
8. I hate to be with people who are unpredictable.
9. I hate to change my plans at the last minute.
10. I find that a consistent routine enables me to
enjoy life more.




12. I become uncomfortable when the rules in a 
situation are not clear.
Appendix D
Favorability Scale
Below are a number of questions. Using your knowledge of 
group X and group Y, circle the response that best 
represents your personal feelings. Please answer all the 
questions and, please, circle only one response.
Listed below are a number of attributes which, while 
not true of all members of any group, might be more 
characteristic of the members of one group than the other. 
For each of the attributes, please indicate how likely you 
think it is that that characteristic is descriptive of the 
members of each group. Circle a response for each group. 









Group X 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Group Y 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Irresponsible
Group X 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
Group Y 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Trustworthy
Group X 1 2 3








Group X 1 2
Group Y 1 2
Unsociable
Group X 1 2
Group Y 1 2
Loyal
Group X 1 2
Group Y 1 2
Honest
Group X 1 2
Group Y 1 2
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
3 4 5 6 7
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While waiting for your airplane to arrive, you encounter a 
person. You quickly begin a conversation and discover you 
have many things in common with this other person: 
interests, goals, experiences, etc. What may be the group 
membership of this person?:
1 Definitely believe the person is a member Of group
Y
2 Moderately believe the person is a member of group
3 Slightly believe the person is a member of group Y
4 Unsure
5 Slightly believe the person is a member of group X
6 Moderately believe the person is a member of group
X
7 Definitely believe the person is a member of group
X
You are the chief executive of an engineering firm and
must hire a new program director. You have interviewed many
people and discover they all seem to be qualified. Knowing 
what you do about the two target groups - who would you be
more likely to hire?:
1 Definitely favor a member of group X
2 Moderately favor a member of group X
3 Slightly favor a member of group X
4 Unsure
5 Slightly favor a member of group Y
6 Moderately favor a member of group Y
7 Definitely favor a member of group Y
A college freshmen takes calculus and receives a D for 
a course grade. What could the students membership be?:
1 Definitely believe the person is a member of group
Y
2 Moderately believe the person is a member of group
Y
3 Slightly believe the person is a member of group Y
4 Unsure
5 Slightly believe the person is a member of group X
6 Moderately believe the person is a member of group
X
7 Definitely believe the person is a member of group
X
A room is filled with 100 people. Of these, 50 people 
are members of group Y and 50 people are members of group X. 
One person is chosen at random from the room of 100 and 
fills out a questionnaire. You discover she: (a) owns and
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operates her own company (b)enjoys reading books and (c)is 
an excellent communicator. What are the chances this person 
is from group X ? :
Suppose you are a judge giving out points to one 
members of each group. The points can be exchanged for a 
variety of different prizes. However, you can only 
distribute the points in one of the following ways - which 
would you choose?
1. 9 points to person in group X / 2 points to person 
in group Y
2. 9 points to person in group X / 7 points to person 
in group Y
3. 18 points to person in group X / 9 points to 
person in group Y
4. 7 points to person in group X / 7 points to person 
in group Y
5. 18 points to person in group Y / 9 points to 
person in group X
6. 9 points to person in group Y / 7 points to person 
in group X
7. 9 points to person in group Y / 2 points to person 
in group X
In general, how do you feel about the two groups?
1. I strongly favor group X over group Y
2. I moderately favor group X over group Y
3. I slightly favor group X over group Y
4. I neither favor group X nor group Y
5. I slightly favor group Y over group X
6. I moderately favor group Y over group X
7. I strongly favor group Y over group X
Rate how well-suited members of group X and group Y are for 
each of the following occupations using the following scale. 






















Please answer the following questions to the best of your
ability and circle the number corresponding to your answer.
1. Working together
1. I believe that I would very much dislike working 
with members of group X in an experiment
2. I believe that I would dislike working with 
members of group X in an experiment
3. I believe that I would dislike working with 
members group X in an experiment to a slight 
degree
4. I believe that I would neither particularly 
dislike nor particularly enjoy working with 
members of group X in an experiment
5. I believe that I would enjoy working with 
members of group X in an experiment to a slight 
degree
6. I believe that I would enjoy working with
members of group X in an experiment
7. I believe that I would very much enjoy working 
with members of group X in an experiment
2. Personal feelings
1. I feel that I would probably like members of group 
X very much
2. I feel that I would probably like members of group 
X
3. I feel that I would probably like members of group
X to a slight degree
4. I feel that I would probably neither
particularly like nor particularly dislike members
of group X
5. I feel that I would probably dislike members of 
group X to a slight degree
6. I feel that I would probably dislike members of 
group X
7. I feel that I would probably dislike members of 
group X very much
3. Personal feelings
1. I feel that I would probably like members of group
Y very much
2. I feel that I would probably like members of group
Y
3. I feel that I would probably like members of group
Y to a slight degree
4. I feel that I would probably neither 
particularly like nor particularly dislike members
of group Y
5. I feel that I would probably dislike members of 
group Y to a slight degree
6. I feel that I would probably dislike members of 
group Y
7. I feel that I would probably dislike members of 
group Y very much
Working together
1. I believe that I would very much dislike working 
with members of group Y in an experiment
2. I believe that I would dislike working with 
members of group Y in an experiment
3. I believe that I would dislike working with 
members of group Y in an experiment to a slight 
degree
4. I believe that I would neither particularly 
dislike nor particularly enjoy working with 
members of group Y in an experiment
5. I believe that I would enjoy working with 
members of group Y in an experiment to a slight 
degree
6. I believe that I would enjoy working with 
members of group Y in an experiment
7. ’I believe that I would very much enjoy working
with members of group Y in an experiment
Appendix E 
Wilderness Team Exercise 
You have just crash-landed in the woods of northern 
Minnesota and southern Manitoba. It is 11:32 A.M. in mid- 
January. The light plane in which you were traveling 
crashed on a lake. The pilot and copilot were killed. 
Shortly after the crash the lane sank completely into the 
lake with the pilot's and copilot's bodies inside. None of 
you are seriously injured and you are all dry.
The crash came suddenly, before the pilot had time to 
radio for help or inform anyone of your position. Since 
your pilot was trying to avoid a storm, you know the plane 
was considerably off course. The pilot announced shortly 
before the crash that you were 20 miles northwest of a small 
town that is the nearest known habitation.
You are in a wilderness area made up of thick woods 
broken by many lakes and streams. The snow depth varies 
from above the ankles in windswept areas to knee-deep where 
it has drifted. The last weather report indicated that the 
temperature would reach minus 25 degrees Fahrenheit in the 
daytime and minus 40 at night. There is plenty of dead wood 
and twigs in the immediate area. You are dressed in winter 
clothing appropriate for city wear - suits, pantsuits, 
street shoes, and overcoats.
While escaping from the plane, the several members of 
your group salvaged 12 items. Your task is to rank these
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items according to their importance to your survival, 
starting with 1 for the most important item and ending with 
12 for the least important one.
You may assume that the number of passengers is the 
same as the number of persons in your group, and that the 
group has agreed to stick together.
Rank the following items according to their importance 
to your survival, starting with 1 for the most important One 
and proceeding to 12 for the least important one.
Item Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3
Ball of steel wool     .
Newspapers ______  ______  ______
(one per person)
Compass   ' ______
Hand ax ______  ______  ______
Cigarette lighter   ,__ ______
(without fluid)
Loaded .45 caliber ______  ______  ______
pistol
Sectional air map _____ _ ______  ______
made of plastic
20-ft by 20-ft piece ____________ ■_________
of heavy-duty canvas
Extra shirt and pants ______  _____ _ ______
for each survivor
Can of shortening 
Quart of 100-proof 
whiskey
Family-size chocolate 
bar (one per person)
